

# Conflict and Identity: Explaining Turnout and Anti-integrationist Voting in the Danish 2004 Elections for the European Parliament

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This article investigates electoral participation and the antecedents of anti-integrationist voting (AIV) in the Danish 2004 European parliamentary elections. First, it focuses on the effects of the campaign and assesses the importance of social demographics and political predispositions vis-à-vis mediated and interpersonal communication on turnout. Second, it investigates AIV, focusing on 'hard' utilitarian predictors and 'soft' cultural predictors. It draws on the European Election Study (EES) post-electoral voter survey and a media content analysis of the most important news media outlets. Its findings corroborate previous research on political participation and shows significant positive effects of interpersonal political discussion and exposure to news media that portrayed the European elections as a conflict-laden contest on turnout. The analysis of AIV highlights the importance of proxies (lack of trust and dissatisfaction with the incumbent government) and political ideology, but also feelings of identity. The latter provides evidence from the Danish context in support of an emerging body of literature emphasizing 'soft' explanations of euroscepticism.

## Introduction

Understanding voters' behaviour in elections concerning issues of European integration has increased in importance in the wake of emerging euroscepticism (Hooghe & Marks 2006; Szczerbiak & Taggart 2006), the low turnout at the 2004 European parliamentary elections and the negative outcomes of national referendums on the European Union (EU) constitutional treaty. In this article, we study the European parliamentary elections in Denmark.<sup>1</sup> More specifically we have two goals. We first investigate *participation* in the European parliamentary election, and focus in particular on the effects of the campaign to assess the importance of social demographics and political

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predispositions vis-à-vis mediated and interpersonal communication on turnout. Second, we investigate the antecedents of an *anti-integrationist party choice* in this election with particular focus on 'hard' utilitarian predictors and 'soft' cultural predictors.

Despite the fact that the Danish electorate has always been sceptical about further European integration, relatively little is known about the behaviour of the Danish voters in the context of European elections, both in terms of their propensity to turn out to vote and in terms of their vote choice (however, see Pascal & Siune 1994; Nielsen 1996; Goul Andersen 2000b).<sup>2</sup> The Danish case is interesting for understanding the antecedents of and changes in anti-integration sentiments, and Denmark was one of the first countries to show euroscepticism on both the left and the right sides of the ideological spectrum (De Vreese & Semetko 2004; Van der Eijk & Franklin 2004).

Different factors affect citizens' choice to turn out to vote and their choice for either a pro- or anti-integrationist party. We will outline each of these different factors and formulate hypotheses to be tested in our study of the 2004 European Parliament (EP) elections.

## Who Votes in European Elections?

In the list of 'usual suspects' *social demographic characteristics* have long been known to affect turnout (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Higher levels of education are positively related to turnout. Other research has demonstrated that gender matters, such that females are less likely to vote than males (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). Finally, age is related to voting so that young people turn out to vote comparatively less and elderly people comparatively more (Franklin 2003). Turning to *attitudes and predispositions*, in the United States the strength of partisanship is used to understand turnout so that strong partisans are more likely to participate in elections than weak or moderate partisans. Ideological preferences towards the right or left (as opposed to centrist preferences) may also mobilize in the context of European politics (De Vreese & Semetko 2004). Moreover, we can expect a positive relationship between political interest and awareness and voting, and, conversely, we can expect political cynicism and dissatisfaction to be negatively related to political participation (e.g. Cappella & Jamieson 1997), though mixed results have been reported in the context of European politics (e.g. De Vreese 2005).

In addition to general political preferences, economic considerations (Radcliff 1992) and support for European integration (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996) can affect the likelihood to vote in EP elections. First, economic consideration may matter for turnout. This has primarily been studied at the aggregate level where voters have been found more likely to vote under conditions of clear economic prosperity or economic crisis. Radcliff (1992) clarified

that in Western democracies economic prosperity positively predicts turnout while in less developed countries, economic problems boost turnout. However, also at individual level, prospective economic expectations can boost turnout, especially among individuals with negative economic outlooks who might feel that there is most to gain from voting. Second, research has demonstrated that attitudes towards European integration affects turnout, particularly so that support for integration and satisfaction with EU democracy positively contributes to turnout compared to opposition to integration and dissatisfaction with EU democracy (Siune & Svensson 1993).

In this article we assess the relationship between each of these indicators and turnout. However, we are particularly interested in the *role of the campaign* as either a mobilizer or demobilizer. Research has moved beyond questioning *if* campaigns matter to focus instead on *when* and *how* they matter. The literature on campaigns and political communication, however, is divided on the effects of campaigns. Theoretically, a campaign serves to engage and mobilize the electorate, but some observers have argued that with the decline in considering voting as a civic duty (Dalton 2000), the decline in importance of political parties (e.g. Cohen 2001) and the increase in importance of (mass) mediated communication, political participation is at stake. With specific reference to the role of the media in campaigns, news media have been blamed for contributing to abstention and voter apathy and cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson 1997; Lichter & Noyes 1996; Patterson 1993, 2002). However, Norris (2000) reported positive correlations between media use and engagement, and Newton (1999) found that exposure to broadsheet newspapers and television news was positively associated with knowledge and political mobilization, while tabloid-reading and general television use (i.e. not news-watching) was associated with lower levels of mobilization.

Campaign effects, however, do not merely include the media, and a distinction is made between direct and indirect, mediated campaign experiences (De Vreese & Semetko 2004). While most citizens rely on indirect sources of information, the engagement in interpersonal communication about politics and elections has long been known to boost knowledge and participation. Few studies have included both mediated and interpersonal communication. McLeod et al. (1999) investigated the impact of using different types of media versus interpersonal discussion on local political participation and found newspaper use and interpersonal discussion to have strong impact on institutionalized participation compared to only a mediated influence of television news. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) found coherent positive effects of interpersonal discussions of politics and that the positive effects of news media exposure outweigh the negative effects. In particular, exposure to news outlets with high levels of political content (such as public television news and broadsheet newspapers) contributes to knowledge gains and increases the propensity to vote. Exposure to news outlets with less political

content has either no effects or positive effects, depending on the content. In other words, the effects of news media use on knowledge and participation seem 'virtuous' rather than 'vicious'.

When investigating turnout, however, it is important to move beyond establishing simple relationships between patterns of news media use and frequency of interpersonal discussions to also include analyses of the *type of information* that can either mobilize or demobilize. To better understand the relationship between media and participation, we need to know if the media provide 'mobilizing information' (Lemert 1981). In this study we therefore distinguish between exposure to different media and outlets and assess the actual *content* of these outlets so as to identify characteristics of the content that may produce differential effects. This approach follows Slater (2004, 169) who argues that 'a primary weakness in the use of global self-report measures [of exposure] is the inevitable uncertainty concerning the exact nature of the relevant content of the media to which respondents are exposed'.

What media content may then be 'mobilizing'? News focusing on disagreement, conflict and differences of opinion between political actors can provide such mobilizing information (De Vreese 2006). Conflict is inherent to political reasoning (Lupia et al. 2000) and in democratic theory conflict is an essential part of democratic decision making (e.g. Sartori 1987). In fact Schattschneider (1960) defined democracy as 'a competitive political system' with elites defining policy options so that citizens can make a choice: 'conflict, competition, organization, leadership and responsibility are the ingredients of a working definition of democracy'.

Conflict results from the competition of different ideas and, typically, precedes consensus about a problem. If citizens realize that conflict is part of democratic decision making, conflict may, in principle, have positive effects on citizens' political attitudes and participation. Citizens may, for example, come to the conclusion that democracy functions well, may be activated to talk about political affairs or may feel a greater incentive to vote. Moreover, conflict is a feature that pervades news. Research on news values points to the importance of conflict (Price 1989), and the presence of conflict is consistently listed as an essential criterion for a news story to make it into the news not only because it 'sells', but also to meet professional standards of balanced reporting (e.g. Galtung & Ruge 1965; Neuman et al. 1992; McManus 1994).

Based on these considerations, we, in this first part of the study, formulate three hypotheses about the effects of news media use and engagement in interpersonal communication during a campaign:

*Hypothesis 1.1:* Exposure to news reporting about politics and elections in terms of *conflict* is positively related to turnout.

*Hypothesis 1.2:* Engaging in interpersonal discussions about elections is positively related to turnout.

*Hypothesis 1.3:* Exposure to conflict in news about the elections and engagement in interpersonal discussions about the elections is positively related to turnout. Technically speaking, we expect a positive interaction of exposure to conflict-driven news and interpersonal communication, with the media providing input for subsequent discussions (McLeod et al. 1974; Chaffee & Mutz 1988).

In the analysis we control for a number of social demographic characteristics and political predispositions as outlined above.

## Why do People Vote for an Anti-integrationist Party?

Turning to the issue of vote choice, our objective is to explain why some Danes choose to vote for an anti-integrationist candidate or party and how anti-integrationist voting (AIV) in Denmark represents a two-dimensional oppositional vote as opposed to a one-dimensional one. By and large, anti-integrationist voting was stable at about 13–14 percent in the last two European elections (1999 and 2004). However, there is an increased focus on anti-integrationist parties, which is partially due to the electoral potential of AIV (Van der Eijk & Franklin 2004) and partially to the increase of AIV in other EU member countries. Nonetheless, only little is known about why people vote for an anti-integrationist party.

The Danish case is interesting because AIV has been an established part of the EP voting since Denmark joined the European Community. Moreover Denmark is a good case for studying different types of AIV since the EU anti-integrationist parties consist of two different dimensions. One side consists of a right-wing party, initially represented by the Progress Party, which announced itself as an EU anti-integrationist party in 1991. The Progress Party, however, never managed to get a representative in the EP. Lately the right-wing AIV has been represented by the Danish People's Party (DPP), which was established in 1995. DPP is positive towards cooperation among states in Europe, but anti-integrationist in the sense that they are against institutional integration and stress that it is important for the Member States to maintain their sovereignty and national identity. In this sense, DPP represents a typically intergovernmental position.

The other side of the anti-integrationist camp in Denmark consists of two anti-EU movements: the People's Movement against EF/EU (Folkebevægelsen mod EF/EU) (PME), constituted in 1972 as a response to the Danish referenda on entering into the European Community, and the June Movement (Junibevægelsen) (JM), constituted in 1992 by dissidents from PME. Both movements are cross-partisan, but most representatives lean to the left/centre of Danish politics. PME's primary objective is that Denmark should terminate its membership of the EU. PME is against supra-national integration

at the European level since this, according to the representatives, promotes EU protectionism, exploitation of developing countries and inequality in the world. The PME and JM share several core values – the main difference being that JM does not reject the EU as such, but works for cooperation about specific issues. In this sense, JM also has concrete policies concerning a lot of issues, which is in contrast to PME. These differences notwithstanding, we treat them as one in our analysis of AIV, which is also legitimized as the movements campaigned as an electoral pact in 2004.

Given these characteristics, we apply two different types of AIV: people who vote for the DPP, on the one hand, and people who vote for either the PME or the JM, on the other. In the 2004 election, each of the anti-integrationist wings gained one representative in the EP. This was status quo for the DPP, which also had one representative in the EP in 1999. The 2004 EP election also was status quo for the PME, having one representative in 1999, but two representatives in 1994. On the contrary, the 2004 EP election was a major down-turn for the JM, which gained two and three representatives in the 1994 and 1999 elections, respectively, but only one in 2004.

Who, then, votes anti-integrationist? There are many pundits for an ‘anti-vote’ – especially in the literature on EU-related referendums. First, we assume a negligible relevance of social demographics (Franklin et al. 1992). Second, we anticipate that voters who are ideologically strongly profiled (left and right) are more anti-European than centrist, who are more pro (De Vreese 2004). More specifically in the Danish case, we expect that people who are strongly leftist tend to vote more for one of the movements (PME or JM), whereas people who are strongly rightish vote for DPP. Third, following the logic of studies suggesting that citizens rely on proxies when voting on European issues (Franklin et al. 1995), we expect that people who are dissatisfied with the incumbent government (and if the government is pro-EU integration, which is the case in Denmark) tend to vote anti-integrationist. This argument has primarily been pursued in the referendum voting literature (see Franklin (2002) for arguments in favour of the proxy model, Svensson (2002) for a refutation of this and De Vreese & Semetko (2004) for test of both models). We have no immediate reason to expect differences between those who vote for the movements and the DDP, as compared to a pro-integrationist vote.

Fourth, with regard to expectations about the economy, we anticipate that being more pessimistic about one’s personal economic prospects tends to promote anti-integrationist attitudes compared to being optimistic about personal economic prospects (Anderson 1998; De Vreese & Semetko 2004). The fifth hypothesis assumes that a person’s vote reflects their actual attitude towards various issues in the EU (Svensson 2002). Voting, then, is not a proxy or indicator for anything else, but reflects the fact that citizens know on what they are voting. Accordingly, we expect that people who possess

attitudes that are more anti EU also vote for an anti-integrationist party (i.e. either DPP or one of the anti-EU movements). The sixth assumption deals with feelings of European identity, which takes a point of departure in the literature that stresses the importance of national identity as a negative predictor for support for European integration (McLaren 2002; Hooghe & Marks 2004). More specifically, we expect that people who feel less European and hold a more exclusive national sense of identity tend to be more prone to voting for an anti-integrationist candidate than people with a strong European identity. Again we have no reason to expect differences between people who vote for a candidate from one of the movements or DPP.

With the seventh assumption, we expand on the relevance of a fairly 'new kid on the block' – namely attitudes towards immigration. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) have demonstrated the relevance of anti-immigrant sentiments as predictor for reluctance to integration. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that as the EU changes, different attitudes become relevant. In recent years, immigration has been a very salient issue – also in relation to the EU. When it comes to immigration sentiments, we expect major differences between the attitudes of the two anti-integrationist parties. Looking at the parties' programmes, DPP stresses that immigration policy stays at the national level and the party represents a restrictive immigration policy. Also, in national elections, anti-immigration attitude is an important explanation of why people vote for DPP (Goul Andersen 2003). Consequently, we assume that anti-immigrant attitudes may explain why people voted for DPP in the last EP election.

Turning to the anti-EU movements, PME does not really have an immigration policy since their primary objective, as mentioned above, is to get Denmark out of the EU. JM, on the other hand, stresses, like the DPP, that immigration policy should stay at the national level – but for different reasons. JM argues that it is important to follow United Nations conventions and that this is best done at the national level allowing for integration to be founded on popular understanding and engagement, which cannot be accomplished at a European level. Also JM stresses that they are not against Turkey becoming a member of the EU just because of the different culture, and encourage increased dialogue between the EU and the Arabic world. This reflects an attitude that Denmark has a global responsibility to try to integrate immigrants and be open and positive towards other cultures. Thus, even though immigration issues probably are not among the most important policy areas for candidates from the movements, we expect that positive attitudes towards immigration can explain why people vote for one of the movements.

Given the assumed different types of AIV, we specify the following hypotheses to be tested in this second part of the study. We control for the impact of SES (social-economic status) variables, but do not expect these to exert an impact on AIV. The hypotheses are:

*Hypothesis 2.1:* Strongly polarized ideological preferences are related to AIV relative to moderate ideological preferences. More specifically, we expect that people with (strong) right-wing preferences are more likely to vote for DPP, whereas people with (strong) left-wing preferences are more likely to vote for the movements.

The following four hypotheses (2.2–2.5) predicting AIV apply in general and are formulated relative to pro-integration voting. We have no a priori reason to expect differences between voters for the DPP and the anti-EU movements, respectively. In particular, we expect that:

*Hypothesis 2.2:* Low levels of satisfaction with incumbent government are related to AIV (given the pro-integration standpoint of the incumbent government).

*Hypothesis 2.3:* Negative economic expectations are related positively to AIV.

*Hypothesis 2.4:* Low levels of support of the EU are related positively to AIV.

*Hypothesis 2.5:* Low levels of European identity are related positively to AIV.

*Hypothesis 2.6:* Attitudes towards immigration are related to AIV. More specifically, we expect that people who have more anti-immigrant sentiments than those who voted for a pro-EU party are more likely to vote DPP, whereas those who have more positive attitudes towards immigrants are more likely to vote for one of the movements.

## Method

The study relies on two data sources. First we use the Danish part of the 2004 European Election Survey (ESS), which is a post-election survey conducted in 24 of the 25 EU member countries (see [www.europeanelectionstudies.net/](http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net/)).<sup>3</sup> Second, we rely on data about Denmark from an EU-wide media content analysis of the news media coverage of the 2004 elections.<sup>4</sup>

The survey is representative for the Danish population of 18+ years of age. It was a CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) survey conducted in the period between 17 June (i.e. immediately after the Danish EP election on 13 June) and 27 September 2004. A total of 2,000 individuals were invited to participate in the study, of which 1,317 did so. This leads to a response rate of 65.4 percent – a level that is very satisfactory compared to similar surveys about political issues in Denmark, which usually obtain response rates somewhere between 55 and 60 percent. In Table 1, we list the independent variables included in the analysis. For descriptive information and the exact question wording, see the Appendix. The analysis contains two *dependent variables*: turnout and vote choice. The turnout variable is dichotomous (voted/did not vote). The actual turnout rate in the elections was 47.9, while

64.5 percent of the respondents reported to have voted. The measure of turnout is subject to over-reporting (which, however, is a well-known phenomena and not higher in the present study than in other studies), yet we are not making inferences about the substantive level of turnout, but rather focusing on the underlying explanations. Turning to vote choice, the other dependent variable, we construct a categorical variable with three categories: voted for DPP, voted for one of the anti-EU movements (PME/JM), voted for a pro-integration party (i.e. the Social Democrats, the Social-Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party).<sup>5</sup> The analysis contains a series of independent variables (see Table 1). The theoretical rationale for each of the variables has been outlined above.<sup>6</sup> The *independent variables* are organized according to the two dependent variables.

### *Media Content Analysis*

For information about the media coverage of the 2004 EP elections in Denmark, we, as mentioned, rely on data on Denmark from a media content analysis. The study investigated two television news programmes and three national newspapers (broadsheet and tabloids) from each country. In Denmark, these were *DR TV-Avisen*, *TV2 Nyhederne*, *Politiken*, *JyllandsPosten* and *Ekstra-Bladet*. Television and newspapers are consistently listed as the most important sources of information about the EU for citizens in Europe, including Denmark (Eurobarometer 54–62). The analysis includes the two weeks leading up to the elections (see also Leroy & Siune 1994).

For television, the entire news programme of each station was coded. The unit of coding and of analysis is the individual news story – defined as a change of topic typically introduced by the anchorperson. All analyses are based on length of the individual news story. For newspapers, the unit of analysis was also the individual news story. All stories on the front page of the newspaper as well as a random page inside the main section of the newspaper and all news stories about the EP elections throughout the newspaper were coded. In the analyses presented here, we use the analysis of the front pages as the base. In total for Denmark, 2,194 were analysed (379 television news stories and 1,815 newspaper stories). Coding was conducted at Medien-Tenor by native speakers of Danish. The coders were trained, supervised and instructed by the team of principal investigators. The intercoder reliability tests for the measures relevant to this study were satisfactory (the intercoder agreement was 90 percent for the topic measure and between 86 and 100 percent for the remaining measures).

We first assess the *visibility of the EP elections*. Each news story was coded for *topic*. To get a general sense of the news and information environment during the campaign, we recoded the detailed topic coding into broader categories: ‘international conflicts’, ‘social policies’, ‘sport’, ‘crime’,

Table 1. Coding of Variables

Coding of independent variables relevant for explaining turnout	
Gender	Male <i>Female</i>
Age	18–30 years <i>31–59 years</i> 60+ years
Education	Lower education (primary school or less) <i>Higher education</i> (longer than primary school)
Ideological preference	10-point scale recoded into three variables: <i>Left (1–3)</i> Center (4–6) Right (7–10)
Prospective economic expectations	Coded from 1 (negative expectations) to 5 (positive expectations)
Political interest	Coded from 1 (low interest) to 3 (high interest)
Political cynicism	2-item index coded from 1 (low cynicism) to 4 (high cynicism)
Support European integration	Scale coded as 1 (low support) to 10 (high support)
Satisfaction with EU democracy	Scale coded as 1 (low satisfaction) to 5 (high satisfaction)
Campaign communication:	
Interpersonal communication about the EU	Coded as 1 (no communication) to 3 (frequent communication)
Days reading newspaper	Coded as 0–7 days
Days watching public broadcasting news	Coded as 0–7 days
Days watching commercial news	Coded as 0–7 days
Coding of independent variables relevant for explaining anti-integrationist vote	
Gender	<i>Male</i> Female
Age	18–30 years <i>31–59 years</i> 60+ years
Education	<i>Lower education</i> (primary school or less) Higher education (longer than primary school)
Economic expectations	Worse than today <i>Same/better than today</i>
Trust in government	Scale coded as 1 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)
Attitude towards immigration	Agree that immigrants is a threat <i>Disagree that immigrants is a threat</i>
Ideological preferences	Scale coded as 1 (left) to 10 (right)
Support European integration	Scale coded as 1 (unification has already gone too far) to 10 (unification should be pushed further)
EU identity	Three items index from low to high

*Note:* Categories in italics mark the reference category in the dummy variable. Otherwise variables are entered as covariates in the analysis.

'party politics', 'economy', 'accidents', 'culture', 'environment and energy', 'weather', 'security and crime', 'foreign policy' and a 'miscellaneous' category. To tap the presence of *conflict news framing*, we rely on three dichotomous indicators (see De Vreese et al. 2001): the presence of conflictual language (metaphors from sports, games, war), the presence of two or more sides of an event or issue, and explicit mentioning of disagreement and conflict.

### *Data Analysis*

We test four models of turnout. All models are logistic regression models with the dichotomous dependent variable being turnout in the election (coded as 1). The models predicting an anti-integrationist vote are multinomial logistic regression with a vote for the anti-EU movements coded as 1 and vote for the DPP coded as 2. The reference category is pro-EU parties, coded as 3.

## Results


### *The Campaign in the Media*

The Danish news media devoted more attention to the EP elections in 2004 compared to 1999. In 1999, 8 percent of the time on television news in Denmark was devoted to EU news (De Vreese et al. 2006), while this was 21 percent in 2004. On the front page of national newspapers, 11 percent of the stories was devoted to the EU news in 1999 (De Vreese et al. 2006), while this dropped to 7 percent in 2004. Turning to the presence of the conflict news frame (see Figure 1), we found this frame to be particularly present at DR with about two-thirds of all stories containing conflictual language and focusing on two or more sides of an issue and in more than 50 percent of the stories explicitly focusing on conflict and disagreement. TV2 was less conflict driven, with about 60 percent of the stories containing reference to two or more sides, but only about a fifth of the stories focusing explicitly on conflicts or disagreement. The broadsheet papers (*Politiken* and *Jyllandsposten*) differed marginally in their overall focus on conflict, while the tabloid paper (*EkstraBladet*) contained less conflict and explicitly focused on conflicts or disagreement in 30 percent of its stories about the elections.

### *Turnout*

Our analysis of turnout confirms previously established relationships between gender, age and education (Model 1, Table 2). Men, elderly citizens and

Figure 1. Proportion of News Containing Elements of Political Conflict.



Notes: Entries are percentages of stories about the European elections containing different elements of conflict. Base is JyllandsPosten 88, Politiken 112, EkstraBladet 111, DR TV Avisen 19, TV2 Nyhederne 18.

those with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in EP elections. Including a range of political predispositions and attitudes, our analyses confirm previously established relationships between political interest, support for European integration and turnout (see Model 2, Table 2) – that is, the more interested one is in politics and the more one supports integration, the more likely one is to vote. We did not find statistically significant corroborating evidence for the negative influence of pessimistic economic outlook or political cynicism, though the signs of the coefficients were in the expected direction. Also, we did not find any effect of satisfaction with EU democracy. Finally, the results as regards ideological preferences only partly confirms our expectations.

Turning to Model 3 (see Table 2), which focuses on the impact of the *campaign*, we first note the substantial increase in explained variance (Nagelkerke Model 2 = 0.16, Model 3 = 0.27, difference  $p < 0.001$ ). This suggests that the campaign variables add significantly to understanding the variation in turnout. Looking at the direction and magnitude of the hypothesized relationships, we see that interpersonal communication, frequency of newspaper reading and frequency of watching public broadcasting news all positively increase the likelihood of turnout. In particular, the effect of interpersonal communication is noteworthy. A one-unit increase (on a four-point scale of frequency of discussing EU politics) increases the likelihood of

Table 2. Predicting Turnout in European Elections

	Model 1 Social demographics	Model 2 Predispositions	Model 3 Campaign effects	Model 4 Interactive campaign effects
Gender (female)	-0.34** (0.12) 0.71	-0.08 (0.13) 0.92	-0.15 (0.14) 0.86	-0.15 (0.14) 0.86
Young <sup>a</sup>	-0.65*** (0.15) 0.52	-0.59*** (0.16) 0.55	-0.51** (0.18) 0.60	-0.50** (0.18) 1.37
Elderly <sup>a</sup>	0.92*** (0.17) 2.52	0.93*** (0.18) 2.52	0.79*** (0.18) 2.21	0.83*** (0.19) 2.30
Education (high)	0.68*** (0.13) 1.97	0.38** (0.14) 1.47	0.33* (0.15) 1.39	0.32* (0.15) 1.38
Centre ideological preferences <sup>b</sup>		0.41* (0.17) 1.51	0.40* (0.18) 1.49	0.39* (0.18) 1.48
Right ideological preferences <sup>b</sup>		0.32 (0.17) 1.37	0.32 (0.18) 1.37	0.33 (0.18) 1.39
Economic expectations		-0.05 (0.08) 0.95	-0.06 (0.09) 0.94	-0.07 (0.09) 0.93
Political interest		0.71*** (0.10) 2.05	0.47*** (0.11) 1.57	0.47*** (0.11) 1.60
Political cynicism		-0.12 (0.09) 0.89	-0.12 (0.10) 0.88	-0.13 (0.10) 0.88
Support European integration		0.09** (0.03) 1.09	0.08** (0.03) 1.08	0.08** (0.03) 1.08
Satisfaction EU democracy		-0.05 (0.09) 0.94	-0.05 (0.09) 0.95	-0.06 (0.09) 0.94
Interpersonal communication about EU			0.79*** (0.10) 2.21	0.55*** (0.15) 1.73
Days reading newspapers			0.11*** (0.02) 1.12	0.10** (0.03) 1.11
Days watching public broadcasting news			0.07** (0.02) 1.08	0.04 (0.03) 1.04
Days watching commercial news			-0.03 (0.03) 0.97	-0.02 (0.03) 0.98
IP communication*frequent public news				0.42* (0.20) 1.52
IP communication*frequent newspaper reading				0.13 (0.21) 1.13
N	1,317	1,317	1,317	1,317
Nagelkerke pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.16	0.27	0.27
Percentage correctly classified	66.5	68.1	72.6	73.4

Notes: Logistic regression. Entries are B's, standard errors in parentheses and predicted probabilities. <sup>a</sup>Reference category is voters aged 31–59.

<sup>b</sup>Reference category is left ideological preferences. \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

turnout by 2.21. This confirms Hypothesis 1.2; indeed engaging in interpersonal discussions about elections seems to be positively related to turnout. Given the findings from the media content analysis (Figure 1) that showed that, in particular, the public broadcaster DR emphasized conflict in its coverage and also showed that there were few discernable differences between the newspapers in terms of their focus on conflict, we can interpret the positive coefficients for watching public news and reading newspapers. Moreover, the absence of effect for watching 'commercial' news (TV2) is supported by the content data. Model 3 therefore confirms Hypothesis 1.1: exposure to news reporting about politics and elections in terms of conflict is positively related to turnout.

Turning finally to Model 4, which replicated Model 3 but also includes the interaction terms between interpersonal communication and frequency of newspaper reading and public television news watching, respectively, we find a modest, though significant, effect of the interaction between frequency of interpersonal discussion and public television news watching. Moreover, in this model, the significant main effect of public television news watching disappears. This suggests that exposure to conflict news was particularly beneficial for the propensity to turnout to vote when individuals also engaged in discussions with others about EU politics and, in this manner, the analysis confirms Hypothesis 1.3.

### *Anti-integrationist Voting (AIV)*

The anti-integration parties and movements in Denmark won three candidates at the EP in 2004. Even though this is a decrease in comparison to earlier elections, one of our objectives is to explain *why* people vote for anti-integrationist parties and candidates. Specifically, we have substantiated a number of hypotheses trying to explain why people have voted for the DPP and the anti-EU movements, respectively. To analyse AIV, we ran eight models (see Table 3), with the last fully specified model being of most interest. For reasons of presentational clarity, we present the models introducing a new variable at the time, only controlling for SES. Thereby we can identify whether the analysis points at trends that can illuminate our hypotheses, even if the effects are not significant in the full model.

Considering the six hypotheses we put forward to explain why people vote for an anti-integrationist party in turn, the analysis first confirms that socio-economic variables do not play a significant role. Second, the analysis only partially confirms that strong ideological preferences have an effect since this only seems to be the case for the anti-EU movements (Models 4 and 8); people who are more leftist than those who vote for a pro-EU party tend to be more prone to vote for an anti-EU movement. On the contrary, political ideology does not seem to have an effect on voting for DPP. Third, dissatisfaction with

Table 3. Explaining Vote Choice

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	SES			Economic expectations			Trust in government			Attitude towards immigration		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
<i>Anti-EU movements</i>												
Gender (female)	0.30	0.23	1.35	0.21	0.24	1.23	0.10	0.25	1.10	0.29	0.24	1.34
Young <sup>a</sup>	0.07	0.33	1.07	0.08	0.34	1.08	-0.08	0.34	0.92	0.04	0.33	1.04
Elderly <sup>a</sup>	-1.78	0.29	0.84	-0.09	0.30	0.92	-0.14	0.30	0.87	-0.08	0.30	0.93
Education (high)	-0.04	0.25	0.96	-0.01	0.26	0.99	0.09	0.26	1.10	-0.15	0.26	0.86
Economic expectations (negative)				0.89**	0.27	2.42						
Trust in government (low-high)							-0.31***	0.05	0.73			
Attitude towards immigration (negative)										-0.59*	0.26	0.55
Political ideology (left-right)												
Attitude EU (anti-pro)												
EU identity (low-high)												
<i>Danish People's Party</i>												
Gender (female)	-0.42	0.31	0.66	-0.40	0.31	0.67	-0.42	0.31	0.66	-0.40	0.31	0.67
Young	-0.13	0.47	0.88	-0.13	0.47	0.88	-0.12	0.48	0.88	-0.10	0.48	0.94
Elderly	-0.01	0.34	0.99	-0.03	0.34	0.97	-0.01	0.34	0.99	-0.11	0.34	0.90
Education (high)	-0.61	0.35	0.55	-0.61	0.35	0.54	-0.60	0.35	0.55	-0.41	0.36	0.67
Economic expectations (negative)				-0.24	0.46	0.79						
Trust in government (low-high)							-0.00	0.07	1.00			
Attitude towards immigration (negative)										0.91**	0.32	2.49
Political ideology (left-right)												
Attitude EU (anti-pro)												
EU identity (low-high)												
N		738			738			738			738	
Nagelkerke		0.02			0.04			0.10			0.05	

Table 3. *Continued*

	Model 5			Model 6			Model 7			Model 8		
	Political ideology			Attitude EU			EU identity			Full model		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
<i>Anti-EU movements</i>												
Gender (female)	0.09	0.25	1.09	0.21	0.24	1.24	0.08	0.25	1.08	-0.20	0.27	0.82
Young	-0.14	0.35	0.87	0.08	0.34	1.08	0.19	0.35	1.21	-0.04	0.37	0.97
Elderly	-0.15	0.31	0.86	-0.31	0.30	0.73	-0.20	0.30	0.82	-0.07	0.33	0.93
Education (high)	0.03	0.26	1.03	0.23	0.27	1.25	0.15	0.27	1.16	0.22	0.30	1.25
Economic expectations (negative)										0.24	0.32	1.28
Trust in government (low-high)										-0.17**	0.06	0.85
Attitude towards immigration (negative)										-0.73*	0.31	0.48
Political ideology (left-right)	-0.38***	0.06	0.68							-0.23**	0.07	0.80
Attitude EU (anti-pro)				-0.25***	0.05	0.78				-0.20**	0.06	0.82
EU identity (low-high)							-0.86***	0.13	0.42	-0.68***	0.15	0.51
<i>Danish People's Party</i>												
Gender (female)	-0.40	0.31	0.67	-0.55	0.32	0.58	-0.60	0.31	0.55	-0.55	0.32	0.58
Young	-0.10	0.48	0.90	-0.09	0.49	0.02	-0.08	0.48	0.92	-0.01	0.50	0.99
Elderly	-0.02	0.34	0.98	-0.10	0.35	0.90	0.01	0.34	1.01	-0.14	0.35	0.87
Education (high)	-0.60	0.35	0.55	-0.20	0.36	0.82	-0.43	0.36	0.65	-0.14	0.37	0.87
Economic expectations (negative)										-0.33	0.48	0.72
Trust in government (low-high)										0.01	0.08	1.01
Attitude towards immigration (negative)										0.40	0.36	1.49
Political ideology (left-right)	0.05	0.07	1.07							0.02	0.08	1.02
Attitude EU (anti-pro)				-0.36***	0.07	0.70				-0.26***	0.07	0.77
EU identity (low-high)							-0.63***	0.15	0.54	-0.40***	0.15	0.67
N		738			738			738			738	
Nagelkerke pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.11			0.11			0.15			0.28	

*Notes:* Multinomial logistic regression. Reference category = pro vote (except SF). <sup>a</sup>Reference category is voters aged 31–59. S.E. = Standard error. \**p* < 0.05; \*\**p* < 0.01; \*\*\**p* < 0.001.

the incumbent government only has an effect for those who vote for one of the anti-EU movements (Models 3 and 8); the higher trust one has in the government, the less likely one is to vote for an anti-EU movement than for a pro-EU party. The fact that dissatisfaction with the government is of no significance for whether one votes for DPP or not, may reflect that DPP, in national politics in 2004, was the main parliamentary foundation for the government (i.e. people may perceive the DPP with the government when it comes to institutional trust).

Fourth, the analysis suggests that personal economic expectations do not have any effect after controlling for other variables (Model 8). Nonetheless, even if the effects are statistically insignificant, it is interesting that the direction of the effects are opposite for the anti-EU movements and DPP, respectively, the tendency being that the more negative one is regarding one's personal economic situation, the more likely one is to vote for an anti-EU movement than for a pro-EU party (this is also confirmed by the model that only includes economic expectations and SES, cf. Model 2). On the contrary, the tendency is that the more negative one is about one's personal economic situation, the less prone one is to vote for DPP as compared to voting for a pro-integration party.

Fifth, we predicted that attitudes matter in the sense that low levels of support for the EU are reflected in a greater likelihood of voting for an anti-integrationist party. The analysis confirms this for both DPP and the anti-EU movements (Models 6 and 8): the more positive one is towards the EU, the less likely one is to vote for either DPP or one of the anti-EU movements. Likewise, it is confirmed since the analysis shows that the more one feels oneself to be a European, the less likely one is to vote for either DPP or an anti-EU movement (Models 7 and 8). In other words, identity matters.

Our final hypothesis dealt with attitudes towards immigration and this is only partially confirmed (Models 4 and 8). Indeed, the simple model only including SES and the anti-immigration attitude variable, indicates that the more negative one is towards immigrants, the less likely one is to vote for one of the anti-EU movements and the more likely one is to vote for DPP compared to voting for a pro-EU party (Model 4). However, when controlling for other variables, the effect only remains statistically significant for the anti-EU movement (Model 8).<sup>7</sup>

In sum, the analyses suggest that when singling out the most important explanations for AIV in a reduced model only controlling for social demographics, these explanations seem to be attitudes towards the EU and identity (whether one feels European). This is reflected in the highest explained variance; 11 (Model 6) and 15 (Model 7) percent, respectively. The results for the remaining hypotheses are in the direction of our expectations, though not all are significant. The results also suggest that future analyses should pay special attention towards the effects of attitudes towards immigration for AIV, which is also addressed below.

## Discussion

We had two objectives in this study: to better understand both turnout at EP elections and the different reasons for an anti-integrationist vote, which in Denmark can take two forms: either in the way of the left-leaning anti-integration movements (PME and JM) or through the right-leaning alternative DPP. Turning first to turnout, our findings corroborate several well established antecedents of turnout: elderly, higher educated people vote more, and politically sophisticated people vote more. Most central, however, the campaign significantly affects turnout. This happens both through engaging in political discussions with others and by turning to specific news media that portrayed the European elections as a conflict-laden contest. This conflict framing highlights disagreement and differences and thus presents a political *choice* to the electorate.

Our study thus dovetails with the 'virtuous circle literature' more than with the media malaise literature. The generally positive outcomes of conflict in news coverage have important implications for political communication. Presumptions about detrimental across-the-board effects of news coverage should be thoroughly checked before packaged in catchy slogans. In one strand of the (popular) scientific literature it has become a well-selling orthodoxy to blame the news media in general and television news in particular for citizens' disengagement in politics (e.g. Fallows 1996). However, as we know for example from research on negative advertising, it is difficult to generalize from the character of the coverage to the character of effects (for review, see Lau et al. 1999). By pointing out the specific feature of news coverage and the contingent condition, this result specifies research that relates media exposure measures to participation variables and reports generally mobilizing effects of the media (e.g. Holtz-Bacha 1990; Norris 2000). News coverage may thus meet the normative standard of encouraging civic participation (Gurevitch & Blumler 1990). However, we do not know what the focus of the disagreements and conflict was, which is an aspect for future research to address. Conflict in political news coverage may alienate citizens from politics if they get the impression that politics is more about disagreement than about the solution of problems. In that case, citizens may form negative political attitudes and refuse to engage in politics. If, however, conflict in coverage may affect citizens both positively and negatively, the question arises under which conditions conflict in news coverage elicits positive, no or negative effects.

Looking next at explanations of anti-integrationist voting (AIV), the analysis confirms extant knowledge: AIV is driven by proxies (lack of trust and dissatisfaction with the incumbent government) and by political ideology. However, these explanations are only valid for explaining a vote for the anti-EU movements.<sup>8</sup> One suggestion why these explanations do not seem to have

any power as regards explaining a vote for the DPP is that people perceive the DPP as a *de facto* constituent part of the incumbent government. This is a highly plausible explanation since the DPP in 2004 was the main parliamentary foundation for the incumbent Liberal-Conservative government.

In addition to these explanations, and more importantly in terms of explanatory power, the analysis confirms that vote choice in European elections is not solely a proxy for other things; people vote on the basis of actual attitudes towards the EU and on the basis of their feeling of identity towards the European community. In other words, if one is negative towards European integration and identifies less with fellow Europeans, one is more prone to vote for an anti-integrationist candidate or party. Finally, immigration sentiments, surprisingly, are not significantly related to voting for the DPP (though the sign of the correlation is in the expected positive direction).<sup>9</sup> Feelings towards immigration, however, matter for a vote for the movements; the more positive one is towards immigration, the more likely one is to vote for one of the movements. The issue therefore clearly matters and the absence of a clear-cut relationship between anti-immigration sentiments and voting for the DPP should most likely be seen in the light of the fact that the incumbent government leads a more restrictive immigration policy where DPP constitutes the parliamentary foundation. Therefore, voters probably do not differentiate sufficiently between the two parties. Moreover, anti-immigration sentiments are no longer exclusive to the DPP and nowadays its voters appear to differ less strongly from the voters of other parties in their sentiments towards immigration, which serves to explain the non-significant impact of these sentiments on DPP voting relative to a vote for a pro-integration party. In fact, given that in the post-election survey the level of fear of immigration among the DPP voters was only significantly different from that of the Social Liberals voters (a small, mostly pro-EU, party) and the anti-EU movements, but not different from other voters, this seems to be a valid explanation. In terms of future research this result not only makes it interesting to dwell more on the explanatory power of immigration sentiments (see De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005), it makes it relevant to study the importance of other (conflict) issues such as sentiments towards globalization or attitudes towards how Europe should deal with issues such as social policies, labour market issues and so on.

Looking at the explanatory power of identity and issues, our findings confirm recent research in Denmark (Goul Andersen 2002a) and an emerging body of literature emphasizing 'soft' explanations more generally (e.g. Hooghe & Marks 2004, 2006). The EU is not only a matter of utilitarian attitudes of what Denmark can gain from being a member. It is moving towards a more complex political community in the minds of the Danes, and citizens do not only orient themselves in terms of representing a Danish interest. The assumption that a general sentiment among Danes is to vote to maintain Danish

interests does not seem as prevalent as it did in the past (Goul Andersen 2002a, 2003). An interesting topic for future research would be to disentangle the more specific characteristics of a European vis-à-vis national identities and flesh out if it is a political identity, as we know it from a national context, or a 'thinner' form of identity. Moreover, we consider the study of electoral dynamics in EP elections important beyond understanding the elections themselves. As attitudes towards the EU are increasingly related to perceptions of political processes, fear of immigration, feelings of identity, it seems plausible that such sentiments, encapsulated in aversion towards further European integration, may play a more important role in domestic politics. A similar argument has been advanced elsewhere suggesting that anti-EU attitudes actually seem to have a potential in the form of a 'sleeping giant' (Van der Eijk & Franklin 2004), which, if activated, can give political parties the possibility to capitalize on anti-EU sentiments in domestic political contests.

As a concluding note to this study of voter mobilization and vote choice in EP elections in Denmark, we point to a general shortcoming of its 'effect analysis'. Our design might not provide internal validity since, strictly speaking, all our findings allow us only to speak of an *association* between conflict in the news and turnout, on the one hand, and feelings of identity and anti-integration voting, on the other. To gain internally valid evidence, experiments are most appropriate, but it is hard to investigate political participation and vote choice in experiments, and we call for panel studies to be applied in the attempt to assess campaign dynamics and electoral change.

## Appendix. Variable Description

### *Gender*

	N	Percentage
Male	664	50
Female	653	50
Total	1,317	100

### *Age*

	N	Percentage
18–30 years	247	19
31–59 years	794	60
60+ years	276	21
Total	1,317	100

### *Education*

	N	Percentage
Lower education (primary school or less)	829	63
Higher education (longer than primary school)	488	37
Total	1,317	100

### *Turnout*

*Question wording:* A lot of people abstained in the European Parliament elections of June 13, while others voted. Did you cast your vote?

	N	Percentage
Yes, voted	850	65
No, did not vote	464	35
Did not answer/not applicable	3	0
Total	1,317	100

### *Vote choice*

*Question wording:* Which party did you vote for?

	N	Percentage
Social Democrats	243	29.0
Social-Liberals	59	7.0
Conservatives	98	12.0
Socialist People's	67	8.0
Danish Peoples	51	6.0
Christian Democrats	11	1.0
Liberals	192	23.0
June Movement	58	7.0
People's Movement against EU	26	3.0
Other parties	4	0.5
Other answers (e.g. not applicable)	41	5.0
Total	850	100.0

### *Ideological preference*

*Question wording:* In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point scale. On this scale where 1 means 'left' and 10 means 'right', which number best describes your position?

Mean	5.9
Standard deviation	2.3
Valid answers	N = 1,231
Did not answer/not applicable/refuse	N = 86

### *Prospective economic expectations*

*Question wording:* And over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will be?

	N	Percentage
A lot better than today	29	2
A little better than today	458	35
Stay the same	514	39
A little worse than today	198	15
A lot worse than today	26	2
Did not answer/not applicable	92	7
Total	1,317	100

### *Political interest*

*Question wording:* To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? Very, somewhat, a little, not at all?

	N	Percentage
Very	247	19
Somewhat	595	45
A little	403	31
Not at all	60	5
Did not answer/not applicable	12	1
Total	1,317	100

### *Political cynicism*

*Question wording:* Thinking about the campaign for the European Elections, how much would you say you agree with the following statements?

- A. The candidates are too superficial in arguments.
- B. The campaign is more about strategy than content.

	Candidates superficial (N)	Candidates superficial (percentage)	Campaign (N)	Campaign (percentage)
Strongly agree	360	27	576	44
Agree	344	26	262	20
Disagree	142	11	79	6
Strongly disagree	106	8	67	5
Did not answer/not applicable	365	28	333	25
Total	1,317	100	1,317	100

### *Support European integration*

*Question wording:* Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point scale. On this scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?

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Mean	5.3
Standard deviation	2.5
Valid answers	1,242
Did not answer/not applicable/refuse	75

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### *Satisfaction with EU democracy*

*Question wording:* All in all again, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?

---

	N	Percentage
Very satisfied	81	6
Fairly satisfied	615	47
Not very satisfied	326	25
Not at all satisfied	106	8
Did not answer/not applicable	189	14
Total	1,317	100

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### *Campaign communication*

#### *A: Interpersonal communication*

*Question wording:* How often did you do any of the following during the three or four weeks before the European election? How often did you talk to friends or family about the election?

---

	N	Percentage
Often	226	17
Sometimes	677	52
Never	409	31
Did not answer/not applicable	5	0
Total	1,317	100

---

#### *B: Days reading newspaper*

*Question wording:* And how many days of the week do you read the newspaper? 0–7 days.

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Mean	4.2
Standard deviation	3.0
Valid answers	1,316
Did not answer/not applicable/refuse	1

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*C: Days watching public broadcasting news*

Combined variable from two questions:

Normally, how many days do you watch the news on television? 0–7 days.

Which channels or television programmes do you watch regularly (*DR – broadcasting television*)

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Mean	4.5
Standard deviation	2.8
Valid answers	1,302
Did not answer/not applicable/refuse	15

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*D: Days watching commercial news*

Combined variable from two questions:

Normally, how many days do you watch the news on television? 0–7 days.

Which channels or television programmes do you watch regularly (*TV2 – commercial television*)?

---

Mean	4.6
Standard deviation	2.8
Valid answers	1,316
Did not answer/not applicable/refuse	1

---

*Trust in government*

*Question wording:* Please tell me on a score of 1–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions, I read out. 1 means that you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means that you have complete trust. If you do not know an institution well enough, just say so and I will go on to the next.

The Danish Government.

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Mean	6.6
Standard deviation	2.4
Valid answers	1,297
Did not answer/not applicable/refuse	20

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*Attitudes towards immigration*

*Question wording:* Now I have some questions from the political debate and I would like to hear how much you agree or disagree with them:

Immigration makes up a serious threat to our national character.

---

	N	Percentage
Strongly agree	346	26
Agree	253	19
Neither/nor	87	7
Disagree	206	16
Strongly disagree	377	29
Did not answer/not applicable	48	2
Total	1,317	100

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### *EU identity*

The three questions that make up the index (simple additive index, factor analysis is one-dimensional, measurement of reliability (Cronbach's alpha) is 0.68) are:

*Question wording:* Do you ever think of yourself not only as a Danish citizen, but also as a citizen of the EU?

	N	Percentage
Often	248	19
Sometimes	484	37
Never	551	42
Did not answer/not applicable	34	2
Total	1,317	100

*Question wording:* Are you personally proud or not to be a citizen of the EU? Would you say you are . . .

	N	Percentage
Very proud	143	11
Fairly proud	427	32
Net very proud	339	26
Not at all proud	157	12
Did not answer/not applicable	251	19
Total	1,317	100

*Question wording:* Now I have some questions from the political debate and I would like to hear how much you agree or disagree with them:

I feel as much as a European, as I feel as a Dane.

	N	Percentage
Strongly agree	209	16
Agree	154	12
Neither/nor	53	4
Disagree	242	18
Strongly disagree	623	47
Did not answer/not applicable	36	3
Total	1,317	100

### NOTES

1. The elections were held on 13 June 2004. The elections gave the Social Democrats 5 seats (+2 compared to the EPE in 1999; Venstre (liberals) 3 (-2); Conservatives 1 (no change); June Movement 1 (-1); Socialist People's Party 1 (no change); Danish People's Party 1 (no change); Danish Social liberal party 1 (no change); People's Movement against the EU 1 (no change). The government at the time of the elections (elected in 2001) consisted of Venstre and the Conservatives.
2. For studies that more generally study the Danish EU referenda and Danes' attitudes towards the EU, see Goul Andersen & Hoff 1992; Siune 1992, 1994; Siune & Svensson 1993; Goul Andersen 1994, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Siune et al. 1994a, 1994b; De Vreese & Semetko 2004.

3. The Danish part of the 2004 European Election Survey was funded by the Danish Social Science Research Council. The survey was coordinated by Joergen Goul Andersen, Johannes Andersen and Mette Tobiassen (Aalborg University) and the fieldwork was conducted by the Danish National Institute of Social Research.
4. The media content analysis was funded by research grants from the Dutch Science Foundation NWO (VENI and VIDI grants), the EU CIVICACTIVE programme, the Halle Foundation and the Claus M. Halle Institute for Global Learning at Emory University, and the University of Amsterdam, to the principal investigators, Susan Banducci (Universiteit Twente), Claes H. de Vreese (Universiteit van Amsterdam) and Holli A. Semetko (Emory University).
5. SF (the Socialist People's Party) represents both pro- and anti-EU candidates. Thus, for reasons of interpretation and generalizability, people who have voted for the party are excluded from the analysis.
6. Following the suggestion of one of the anonymous reviewers, we also modeled the impact of the campaign variables on AIV. We do not report this analysis as we have no clear-cut theoretical argument to include the variables and because it would involve focusing on other aspects of the media content. The analyses yielded no significant relationships between the campaign variables and AIV, except a negative relationship between engaging in interpersonal discussion about the EU and AIV (movements only).
7. We note, based on our media content analysis, that immigration and integration issues were not salient during campaign.
8. We note that AI voting is not equivalent to voting for the opposition. Vote intention in national elections is also included in the EES. Comparing voting behaviour in the European elections with vote intention in national elections it is clear that, to some voters at least, AI voting in EP elections is distinct from opposition voting in national elections.
9. We note that an additional analysis comparing the predictors of AIV for the DPP and the EU movements showed that the impact of anti-immigration sentiment is the only significant difference between support for the DPP and the EU movements.

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